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Article
Every day we face many decisions, ranging from relatively 
ordinary choices such as whether to abide by a diet plan or 
grab a chocolate bar, to life-altering decisions such as 
whether to take a job offer or continue studying. Important 
decisions usually require thinking and planning beyond one’s 
present situation. Indeed, a remarkable function of the human 
mind is that it allows imagining oneself in a different time 
and space, or in another person’s position, thus enabling 
judgments and decisions beyond the self and the present. 
However, people often make suboptimal decisions, in terms 
of neoclassical economic theory, when dealing with the self 
in a future time. Many people prefer a smaller reward now to 
a large reward next year, and generally value options in the 
future less even when they are more lucrative than options in 
the present. This phenomenon is referred to as “temporal dis-
counting,” and the further away the future option, the more 
it tends to be discounted (Ainslie, 1992; Frederick, 
Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Green, Fristoe, & 
Myerson, 1994; Schelling, 1984; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). 
Understanding why people discount future options is impor-
tant because it can help us design strategies to improve inter-
temporal decision making for better long-term outcomes.
Although several explanations for this behavior have 
been suggested, our focus is on how different time points are 
cognitively construed and how manipulating these constru-
als might promote more optimal decision making. Building 
on Construal Level Theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2003), 
we investigate the possibility that more farsighted decisions 
can be encouraged by making the level of construal across 
different time points more similar. Usually the present is 
associated with a concrete, incidental, and situated construal 
(i.e., low level), whereas the future is associated with an 
abstract, decontextualized construal (i.e., high level; Trope 
& Liberman, 2003), and it may be this difference that drives 
the discounting of future options. If true, encouraging either 
(a) the present and the future option to be construed at a low 
level or (b) the present and the future option to be construed 
at a high level should result in less future discounting, and 
therefore more adaptive decisions.
A key aspect of CLT is that it spans many different dimen-
sions of “psychological distance.” Time is one such dimen-
sion, and social distance is another: People close to us whom 
we know well are construed at a relatively low level, whereas 
people far from us with whom we are less familiar are con-
strued at a relatively high level (Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 
2011). Importantly, and in contrast to some earlier work, our 
thesis is not based on the proposition that one kind of con-
strual (i.e., high level) necessarily is associated with optimal 
decision making relative to another (i.e., low level). Rather, 
our aim is to test the possibility that decisions can be 
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enhanced by ensuring that the options are presented at simi-
lar levels of construal, whether high or low.
Theoretical Account of Discounting
A number of—not necessarily mutually exclusive—
explanations for temporal discounting have been proposed. 
First, it might occur because the future is uncertain and 
people prefer certain to uncertain options (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979): Getting the money now is more certain 
than getting it in 1 year, because many unforeseeable things 
might happen in the meantime. Consequently, temporal dis-
counting may be a way to cope with the uncertainty of 
future rewards (Baron, 2000). Supporting this possibility, 
evidence suggests that people make more rational choices 
for certain future events than for hypothetical future events 
(Peters & Büchel, 2010).
Second, people may view their present and future selves 
quite differently. Indeed, one’s future self is often repre-
sented in the same way as other people, for example, by 
attributing more observer-like than actor-like characteristics 
(Pronin & Ross, 2006), and people often make future deci-
sions as if they were making them for somebody else rather 
than themselves (Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008). Indeed, 
the more similar people view their current selves to their 
future selves, the less temporal discounting they show, 
because a future self as a continuum of the present self appre-
ciates a greater reward more than a disconnected future self 
does (Bartels & Rips, 2010).
However, events in the future are not only uncertain and 
possibly unconnected from one’s present situation, but they 
are also thought of in a more abstract, decontextualized way 
(Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). In general, 
when a state or situation is not directly experienced, it is psy-
chologically distant and involves cognitive representations 
that are abstract, schematic, and broad (Trope & Liberman, 
2003). Thus, for future events, uncertainty and abstract 
thinking go hand in hand, and this might be critical for tem-
poral discounting: The immediate reward is construed at a 
concrete, certain level, whereas the future reward is con-
strued on an abstract, uncertain level, with decision makers 
eventually comparing apples and oranges, leading to subop-
timal outcomes. Given the importance of the approach to our 
rationale, we outline CLT in more detail below.
CLT
Trope and Liberman (2003) proposed that psychological dis-
tance involves different mental representations of events, such 
that the distant future involves high-level construals that are 
abstract, decontextualized, and removed from direct experi-
ence, whereas the here and now involves low-level construals 
that are concrete and grounded in physical and perceptual 
experience. Psychological distance is composed of several 
domains: temporal (present vs. past/future), social (self vs. 
other), spatial (close vs. far), and hypothetical (certain vs. 
probable) distance (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007), and 
these domains can operate interdependently, suggesting a sin-
gle underlying cognitive mechanism (Bar-Anan, Liberman, 
Trope, & Algom, 2007; Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, & Alexopoulos, 
2012; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Much research also has 
shown that the level of psychological distance and its 
corresponding construal level influence each other in a bidi-
rectional fashion (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 
2006; Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & Sherman, 2007; Stephan, 
2004).
Accumulating evidence suggests that people make judg-
ments and decisions differently depending on construal level. 
Psychological distance is associated with abstract thought 
and the use of general, holistic processing in various attribu-
tion and judgment tasks (e.g., Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & 
Liberman, 2006; Williams & Bargh, 2008). For example, 
high-level construal encourages global processing in percep-
tual tasks, whereas low-level construal encourages local pro-
cessing (Förster, 2009; Liberman & Förster, 2009). 
High-level construal also boosts creative solutions more than 
low-level construal does (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 
2004). Simple priming with words associated with distance, 
as opposed to closeness, also increases participants’ prefer-
ence for describing activities regarding their abstract ends 
rather than concrete means (Smith & Trope, 2006; Wakslak 
et al., 2006).
In decision making, high-level construals lead people to 
make more self-controlled decisions compared with low-
level construals (Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita & Roberts, 
2010; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). For 
example, high-level construal involves thinking about temp-
tations in more negative terms (Fujita et al., 2006), leads 
participants to favor advertisements appealing to their 
desired self-concept (Freitas, Langsam, Clark, & Moeller, 
2008), and prefer distant to near future options (Trope & 
Liberman, 2000). Trope and Liberman (2000) observed 
participants’ preference changes in future decision making 
and found that temporal distance increased participants’ 
tendency to choose based on high-level characteristics. For 
example, when participants rated the attractiveness of a job 
offer in the distant future, they focused more on the general 
description of the job (i.e., how interesting it was) whereas 
the attractiveness for a near future job was based on the 
description of specific aspects of the job (i.e., how appeal-
ing the training was).
With relevance to the current research, previous work 
showed that an abstract, high-level mind-set reduces tempo-
ral discounting (Malkoc, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010; 
Rogers & Bazerman, 2008). For example, Malkoc et al. 
found that people choose to wait a few days longer to save a 
delivery fee when consumer products are described in a more 
abstract manner as opposed to a concrete manner. Similarly, 
Rogers and Bazerman (2008) observed that when deciding 
on a distant future event, people make choices that serve 
their desired self, whereas focusing on a near future event 
makes people follow the current self’s need.
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Overview of the Current Research
Whereas previous studies have focused on the association 
of high-level construal with more self-controlled, adaptive 
decisions, the current research concentrated on the differ-
ence or mismatch of construal level in choice alternatives 
when choosing between two intertemporal options. That is, 
we propose that temporal discounting is due to two options 
being represented in a dissimilar manner (i.e., one at a low-
level construal and the other at a high-level construal), thus 
making it difficult to compare intertemporal options 
directly.
In the present series of studies, we explored whether a 
similar level of construal might lead to more adaptive 
financial choices.1 Construal differences between two 
rewards might be responsible for people favoring the imme-
diate reward because “here and now” is likely to be repre-
sented concretely, whereas “there and then” is likely to be 
represented abstractly. Thus, people should be able to com-
pare two intertemporal options more effectively when using 
similar construals and therefore prefer the larger future 
reward.
We assume that the more detailed information is avail-
able, the more people can construe a future event in a con-
crete way, corresponding to a low construal level. In contrast, 
when only brief and general information is provided, the 
quality of imagination becomes abstract and general, corre-
sponding to a high-level construal. Therefore, by providing 
detailed information, we should be able to shift people’s per-
spective from what is in the future to what is here and now. 
Similarly, by giving abstract and decontextualized informa-
tion, people’s perspective should change from here and now 
to a psychologically distant perspective. Thus, we tested 
whether construal-level change leads to more similar repre-
sentations of intertemporal rewards, which should result in 
more rational choices.
In five studies, we manipulated construal-level and asso-
ciated psychological distance and investigated their influ-
ence on intertemporal choices. We hypothesized that when 
two intertemporal rewards share a similar level of construal, 
the different options become more comparable, and thus, 
temporal discounting is reduced. Because inductions of 
abstract versus concrete processing have been previously 
shown to influence construal level (e.g., Liberman, Trope, & 
Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010), Studies 1a, 
1b, and 2 consisted of manipulations of construal level, thus 
following Spencer, Zanna, and Fong’s (2005) suggestion of a 
“moderation-of-process” design for situations in which a 
proposed mediator is difficult to measure but easy to manip-
ulate. In contrast to these tests of the path from construal 
level, the presumed mediator underlying psychological dis-
tance, to temporal discounting, Study 3 then measured, and 
Study 4 manipulated, psychological distance. In other words, 
these latter studies investigated the direct path from psycho-
logical distance to temporal discounting.
Study 1A: Making the Future More 
Concrete: Paris Hotels
In Study 1a, we tested temporal discounting after manipulat-
ing construals of now and later options in hypothetical sce-
narios so that they were both construed in a relatively 
concrete way. For the control condition, we used a standard 
temporal discounting procedure of monetary reward as used 
previously (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). The amount of the 
delayed reward was held constant to be “in 1 year,” whereas 
the immediate reward decreased in size, such that there was 
a decision point at which participants switched when the 
immediate reward was too small to be preferred to the larger, 
delayed reward. In other words, this decision point identified 
the current subjective value of the “discounted value,” 
defined as the magnitude of the immediate reward that gen-
erates indifference in choice against the later reward. For this 
control condition, we expected people to show previously 
observed temporal discounting, because relative to the 
immediate reward that is construed concretely, the future 
reward is construed abstractly. In contrast, for the experi-
mental condition, we intended to make the construal level for 
the future reward more similar to the immediate reward, by 
giving participants the opportunity to concretely imagine the 
future option: Participants were presented with a hypotheti-
cal future event, namely a trip to Paris that varied regarding 
the quality of the included accommodation, with the future 
option being more desirable than the immediate option. 
Thus, participants were able to directly compare the features 
of a specific imagined event in the now and later options, 
thus encouraging more adaptive choices relative to the con-
trol condition that dealt with decisions involving two distinct 
construal levels. In other words, we expected that partici-
pants would be more willing to wait for the larger reward 
when both choices were relatively concrete.
Method
Participants. Seventy participants (33 men; M age = 25.47, 
SD = 6.80) were recruited from the Cambridge central library 
and the University College London Union area. Participants 
were approached individually and given a brief paper-and-
pencil survey with no monetary compensation. Half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to the control condition, 
the other half to the experimental condition.
Materials and Procedure
Intertemporal choice. To keep the two conditions as simi-
lar as possible, each involved a check or voucher that could 
be exchanged for a reward (i.e., money or a trip to Paris) and 
could be received either now or in 1 year’s time. Thus, in 
principle, either condition involved being able to experience 
the reward immediately or later. For the Control condition, 
participants made a choice between two options: receiving 
a £500 check in 1 year or receiving a slightly less valuable 
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check right now, and the now options decreased in £40 dec-
rements from £460 to £260. The following instructions were 
given to participants:
Imagine somebody were to give you a check and offered you 
two choices: Either you receive it right now, or you receive it in 
1 year from now. Imagine that the check can be cashed at any 
time once you have received it. Please make this choice for six 
different scenarios.
For the experimental condition, participants made a hypo-
thetical choice between receiving a £500 travel voucher in 1 
year or receiving a slightly less valuable travel voucher right 
now. The following instructions were given to participants:
Imagine somebody were to give you a travel voucher for a 
holiday in Paris and offered you two choices: Either you receive 
it right now, or you receive it in 1 year from now. Imagine that 
the voucher can be used at any time once you have received it. 
Please make this choice for six different scenarios.
Vouchers for Paris trips were varied by including accom-
modation, for example, from five-star hotel suite (for a £500 
voucher), five-star hotel (for a £460 voucher), four-star hotel 
(for a £420 voucher), and so on to a £260 voucher that did not 
include any accommodation. To help participants actively sim-
ulate the future reward, we added color pictures of the accom-
modation corresponding to the value of each travel voucher.
Results 
Discounted values for receiving £500 in 1 year were com-
puted by averaging the switch point in descending choice 
sequences for now options. For example, if a participant pre-
ferred receiving £380 now to receiving £500 in the future, 
but was unwilling to receive £340 now and decided to wait 
for £500 in the future, the discounted value was £360. If par-
ticipants decided to always take now options or later options, 
the discounted value was calculated by averaging the lowest 
(i.e., £260) or highest now option (i.e., £460) on the survey 
with the hypothetically lower (i.e., £220) or higher (£500) 
option, which resulted in £240 or £480, respectively. Mean 
discounted values were compared in a one-way ANOVA 
with condition (control vs. experimental condition) as factor. 
As expected, there was a significant main effect for condi-
tion: Discounted values were higher in the experimental con-
dition (M = 395.43, SD = 73.10) than the control condition 
(M = 354.29, SD = 73.34), F(1, 68) = 5.53, p = .02, η
p
2 = .08, 
indicating that people were more willing to wait for the larger 
reward under similar level of construals.2 To compare effects 
across studies, we also calculated the percentage of reduction 
in discounting by first multiplying the mean difference 
between conditions by 100, then dividing it by the mean of 
the experimental condition. This showed that relative to the 
control condition, the experimental condition showed 10.4 % 
less temporal discounting.
Discussion
As hypothesized, participants were more willing to wait for 
the larger reward in the future when two intertemporal options 
were both represented on similarly concrete levels of con-
strual, compared with participants who made choices between 
dissimilar levels of construal: The average participant in the 
control condition was willing to accept a reward worth about 
£350 right now, whereas the average participant in the experi-
mental condition was not willing to accept any less than about 
£390. Presumably, participants in the experimental condition 
were able to more clearly imagine what it would be like to 
spend a holiday at a fancy hotel in Paris in the future due to 
the concrete construal level. Therefore, participants were able 
to compare the now and later options on a similar type of 
representation that enabled a more direct comparison, which 
in turn reduced their temporal discounting.
Study 1B: Making the Future More 
Concrete: Paris Attractions
Although the results of the first study provided evidence for 
our hypothesis, there was a potential confound because pho-
tos were shown for the holiday condition but not for the con-
trol condition. Thus, the use of pictures may have encouraged 
more concrete imagery, and therefore reduced temporal dis-
counting. We therefore removed the photos in Study 1b. To 
provide participants with opportunities for concrete constru-
als that were not based on photos, details about a hypotheti-
cal trip to Paris were given that described specific tourist 
attractions (e.g., Eiffel tower, boat trip on the Seine), and dif-
ferent choices included different numbers of attractions. 
Thus, rather than exposing participants to preexisting stim-
uli, participants were able to concretely imagine specific 
events they personally could experience in Paris, and the 
number of these experiences varied in a linear fashion. 
Furthermore, we added a manipulation check to measure 
imagery complexity by asking about detail of the imagery 
and interest of going on a trip to Paris. Because a concrete 
mind-set might lead participants to spend more time consid-
ering the decision and thus be confounded with construal 
level, we also asked participants to indicate the time spent on 
thinking about the given future event.
Method
Participants. Eighty-one participants (39 men, M age = 23.60, 
SD = 6.29) were recruited from the Cambridge central library 
and University College London Union and tested in the same 
manner as in Study 1a.
Materials and Procedure
Intertemporal choice. The survey was identical to Study 
1a, except that instead of hotel photos, the numbers of Paris 
attractions varied for the experimental condition. A list of six 
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attractions was specified under the title of “Paris attraction 
package” (e.g., a dinner for two at the restaurant at the top of 
the Eiffel tower). The number of attractions depended on the 
value of each travel voucher, for example, a £500 voucher 
including all six attractions, a £460 voucher including five 
attractions, and so on, with no attractions included in the 
£260 voucher.
Manipulation check. To check whether participants imag-
ined the future option more concretely in the experimental 
condition compared with the control condition they indi-
cated in how much detail they thought of the given future 
event, from 1 (not much detail at all) to 7 (very much detail). 
Furthermore, participants in the experimental condition indi-
cated how interested they would be in going to Paris from 1 
(not interested at all) to 7 (very much interested).
Potential confound: Imagery length. To assess whether par-
ticipants in the experimental condition might have consid-
ered the potential trip to Paris not only in more detail but 
also for a longer time, participants indicated for how long 
they had thought of the potential future trip to Paris, or the 
event of receiving the check from 1 (not long at all) to 7 
(very long).
Results
Temporal Discounting. A one-way ANOVA with Condition 
(experimental vs. control) revealed a significant difference in 
discounting: Participants made more adaptive choices in the 
experimental condition (M = 434.00, SD = 71.07) than in the 
control condition (M = 385.37, SD = 79.38), F(1, 79) = 8.43, 
p =.005, η
p
2 = .10. This effect represented a reduction of tem-
poral discounting by 11.21%.
Manipulation Check. A one-way ANOVA showed that partici-
pants in the experimental condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.82) 
imagined the future event in more detail than the control con-
dition (M = 2.77, SD = 1.59), F(1, 79) = 4.51, p =.04, η
p
2 = 
.05. Furthermore, a significant positive correlation emerged 
between discounted value in the experimental condition and 
their interest score, r(40) = .32, p =.04 (two-tailed), indicat-
ing that the more participants were interested in going on a 
trip to Paris in the future, the more they were willing to wait 
for the superior hotel voucher. No other correlations showed 
statistical significance.
Potential Confound: Imagery Length. Participants in the experi-
mental condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.74) spent significantly 
longer thinking about the future event than the control condi-
tion (M = 2.50, SD = 1.37), F(1, 79) = 6.73, p = .01, η
p
2 = .08. 
To test whether imagery length might have contributed to the 
observed effect, we added imagery length to the main analy-
sis as a covariate. The main effect of condition remained sig-
nificant, F(1, 78) = 6.87, p = .01, η
p
2 = .08, and there was no 
effect of the covariate (p = .59), thus suggesting that imagery 
length did not account for the finding.
Discussion
As found in Study 1a, participants were more willing to 
wait for the greater reward when now and later options 
were represented on a relatively concrete level of construal. 
In other words, participants required greater compensation 
in the present for foregoing a £500 holiday in the future 
than they required for foregoing a £500 check in the future. 
In this study, rather than presenting participants with spe-
cific pictures to aid mental simulation, they were given the 
opportunity to come up with subjective concrete construals 
of future events. Despite this difference, the effect was the 
same. Furthermore, participants in the experimental condi-
tion reported that they thought about the future event in 
more detail compared with the control group, indicating 
that we successfully induced a more concrete level of 
representation.
Study 2: More or Less Concrete Trips 
to Paris
The findings from the first two studies suggest that when 
participants formed a relatively concrete representation for 
now and later options, they made more financially beneficial 
choices than participants who compared now and later 
options on relatively different levels of construal. However, 
we must consider the possibility that the condition involving 
the check might have differed in other respects from the con-
dition involving the Paris trip voucher, regardless of con-
strual level. For example, being presented with a potential 
trip to Paris might have involved positive valence, or induced 
a positive mood, which in turn could have influenced partici-
pants’ decision making. Therefore, Study 2 assessed tempo-
ral discounting by comparing two conditions that involved a 
travel voucher to Paris. The only difference between condi-
tions was the level of detail and concreteness regarding the 
Paris trip, with the experimental condition being provided 
with concrete details about the trip, whereas the control con-
dition receiving no such details. We further not only excluded 
items to check the effectiveness of the manipulation but also 
included additional items regarding potential confounds, 
such as interest in going to Paris and enjoyment thinking 
about it, and participants’ current mood.
Method
Participants. One hundred and two U.S. citizens (35 men, M 
age = 36.25, SD = 13.70) participated in an online study on 
choice making, which was posted on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), an online interface shown to provide reliable, 
high-quality data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
Participants were paid $0.20 each. One participant did not 
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provide answers for the manipulation check and confounds, 
and therefore contributed incomplete data.
Materials and Procedure. Instructions were similar to the ones 
used for the experimental condition in Study 1b, but partici-
pants completed the study as an online survey.
Intertemporal Choice. Participants made an intertemporal 
choice concerning a Paris trip voucher by clicking the box of 
which option they preferred between now and later options. 
For the experimental condition, participants were presented 
with options that entailed a list of Paris attractions identical 
to Study 1b. For the control condition, participants were only 
informed that the voucher was for a trip to Paris, and no 
attractions were described.
Manipulation Check. After participants completed the inter-
temporal choice, they reported on imagery detail and how 
easily they visualized themselves in Paris (1 = not easily at 
all to 7 = very easily).
Potential Confounds: Imagery Length, Interest, and Mood. In 
addition to assessing imagery length and interest in going to 
Paris as in Study 1b, we further asked how much participants 
enjoyed thinking about going to Paris (1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much), and how happy (1 = not happy at all to 7 = 
extremely happy) and how excited (1 = not excited at all to 
7 = extremely excited) they felt at the moment.
Results
Temporal Discounting. A one-way ANOVA with Condition 
(experimental vs. control) revealed a significant difference in 
discounting: Participants made more adaptive choices in the 
experimental condition (M = 440.00, SD = 56.57) than in the 
control condition (M = 413.33, SD = 65.93), F(1, 100) = 
4.75, p = .03, η
p
2 = .05. Therefore, the temporal discounting 
was reduced by 6.06%. A marginally significant negative 
correlation emerged between discounted value and how eas-
ily participants could visualize themselves in Paris, r(101) = 
−.18, p = .07 (two-tailed), indicating that participants who 
went for the immediate reward could visualize themselves in 
Paris more easily.
Manipulation Check. A one-way ANOVA showed that partici-
pants in the experimental condition (M = 4.90, SD = 1.46) 
imagined the future event in more detail than the control con-
dition (M = 3.69, SD = 1.78), F(1, 99) = 13.65, p < .001, η
p
2 = 
.12. There was no difference in how easily participants visu-
alized themselves in Paris, p = .55.
Potential Confounds: Imagery Length, Interest, and 
Mood. Because participants in the experimental condition 
(M = 4.23, SD = 1.45) reported spending significantly lon-
ger thinking about the future event than the control 
condition (M = 3.17, SD = 1.70), F(1, 99) = 11.34, p = .001, 
η
p
2 =.10, we added imagery length as a covariate to the main 
analysis. The previously observed effect remained signifi-
cant, F(1, 98) = 4.08, p = .05, η
p
2 =.04, with no effect on the 
covariate (p = .88).
Conditions did not differ regarding how much participants 
enjoyed thinking about going to Paris (control condition: M = 
5.50, SD = 1.50 vs. experimental condition: M = 5.74, SD = 
1.34), F(1, 99) = 0.73, p = .39, or how interested participants 
were in going there (control condition: M = 5.98, SD = 1.47 
vs. experimental condition: M = 6.04, SD = 1.20), F(1, 99) = 
.05, p = .82. Mood analyses revealed that participants in the 
experimental condition (M = 5.11, SD = 1.11) did not differ 
from those in the control condition (M = 4.91, SD = 1.56) in 
how happy they felt at the moment, F(1, 99) = .53, p = .47. 
Likewise, participants’ excitement in the experimental condi-
tion (M = 4.43, SD = 1.46) did not differ from the control 
condition (M = 4.09, SD = 1.75), F(1, 99) = 1.06, p = .31.3
Discussion
Study 2 ruled out the possibility that the effects regarding 
temporal discounting that we observed in the earlier studies 
might have been due to differences in the tasks rather than 
construal level, or other factors such as interest in going to 
Paris or the time spent thinking about going there. Participants 
made more financially advantageous decisions when the 
tasks were identical across conditions, and only differed in 
the detail and concreteness of the future experience. 
Furthermore, positive mood did not differ across conditions, 
indicating that how happy or excited participants felt while 
imagining a trip to Paris did not influence their choices.
Although Studies 1a, 1b, and 2 demonstrated that tempo-
ral discounting could be reduced by making intertemporal 
choices more concrete, temporal discounting should also be 
reduced when intertemporal choices are made less concrete: 
The same effect should occur when now and later options are 
construed on an abstract level as a consequence of increased 
psychological distance. Importantly, this would suggest that 
no type of construal is necessarily preferable, because simi-
larity in construal level should help people make more adap-
tive choices regardless of whether the two intertemporal 
options are construed in a concrete or an abstract fashion. 
Thus, in the next two studies we tested whether increased 
psychological distance would be associated with reduced 
temporal discounting, because now and later options can be 
construed on a similarly high construal level.
Study 3: Intertemporal Choices for 
Strangers
For Study 3, we assumed that with greater psychological dis-
tance, intertemporal options should be construed relatively 
abstractly. We induced a particular dimension of psychologi-
cal distance, namely social distance, which reflects the 
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subjective closeness toward a target person, and can range 
from being very close for a very good friend to very distant 
for a stranger (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Similar attitudinal 
and behavioral consequences of temporal distance and social 
distance are evident in mounting research of CLT, thus sup-
porting their functional equivalence (Pronin et al., 2008; 
Pronin & Ross, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). In 
economic decision making, Jones and Rachlin (2006) 
observed that the closer participants felt to a social contact, 
the more money they decided to forgo when this person then 
benefited from that money. Interestingly, the amount of 
money that people decided to forgo decreased as a hyper-
bolic function with respect to social closeness, similar to the 
pattern observed in temporal discounting (Jones & Rachlin, 
2006; Rachlin & Jones, 2008). Similarly, people were more 
willing to wait for a reward when the intertemporal choice 
was on behalf of a group to which participants belonged, 
compared with making the decision for themselves (Charlton, 
Yi, Porter, Carter, Bickel, & Rachlin, 2013).
We propose that increased social distance alleviates tem-
poral discounting: Making an intertemporal choice for a psy-
chologically distant target should involve a relatively abstract 
construal level, compared with a decision for oneself or for a 
socially close person, such as a best friend. Hence, when 
making a decision for the close contact, the now option should 
be represented in a relatively concrete way, whereas the later 
option should remain abstract due to the nature of intertempo-
ral choice that entails temporal distance. In contrast, when 
making a choice for a stranger, the now option is no longer 
represented in a concrete way, due to the increased social dis-
tance that leads to representing present and future options in a 
relatively abstract way. We expected to observe more rational 
choices when now and later options were represented simi-
larly in an abstract fashion, as would be the case when mak-
ing the choice for a stranger, compared with when the 
intertemporal options were represented in a dissimilar fash-
ion, as would be the case when making the choice for a friend.
For an initial test of this idea, we conducted a correla-
tional study that related subjective closeness toward a target 
person to participants’ temporal discounting. We predicted 
greater willingness to wait for the distant reward with 
increased social distance.
Method
Participants. Thirty participants (15 men; M age = 23.45, 
SD = 4.90) filled out a survey at the University College Lon-
don Union area and were tested in the same manner as in 
Studies 1a and 1b. One participant was excluded due to fail-
ure to follow instructions.
Material and Procedure
Induction of social distance and intertemporal choice. Social 
distance was induced by applying the procedure devel-
oped by Jones and Rachlin (2006). Participants were given 
instructions to imagine creating a list of 100 people closest to 
themselves, ranging from the dearest friend or family mem-
ber at Position 1 to a mere acquaintance at Position 100. The 
identical intertemporal choices used in the control condition 
in Studies 1a and 1b were given to the participants; however, 
this time, all participants made decisions for the person at 
Position 100 rather than for themselves.
Subjective similarity and familiarity rating. After making 
intertemporal choices, participants answered two questions 
concerning the person for whom they made the choice, 
namely, how well they knew the person (1 = not very well at 
all to 7 = very well) and how similar the person was to them 
(1 = not similar at all to 7 = very similar).
Results 
Based on participants’ familiarity ratings (M = 3.12, SD = 
1.53) and similarity ratings (M = 2.81, SD = 1.57), to test the 
hypothesis that people discount less for psychologically dis-
tant others we correlated participants’ rating of how similar 
they rated themselves to the mere acquaintance (i.e., the per-
son Position 100) with their discounted value. As predicted, 
this relationship was significantly negative, r(29) = −.45, 
p =.02 (two-tailed). That is, the greater the perceived psycho-
logical distance between participants and the target person, 
the more adaptive were their choices. Although the correla-
tion between familiarity scores and discounted value was 
also negative, it was not significant, r(29) = −.15, p =.45.
Discussion
As predicted, the more distant the target was for whom par-
ticipants made an intertemporal decision, the less temporal 
discounting they showed. That is, encouraging participants to 
form a high-level construal of the target person receiving the 
rewards encouraged adaptive choices. This study is particu-
larly important for CLT because it shows, as the theory would 
predict, that manipulating construals on a different domain—
social distance—has comparable effects to manipulating fea-
tures of temporal distance seen in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2.
A limitation of Study 3 was that we used a correlational 
design so we were only able to demonstrate an association 
rather than causality. Consequently, in Study 4, we designed 
a between-subjects study that manipulated social distance 
experimentally by comparing intertemporal choices for a 
close versus distant social contact.
Study 4: Intertemporal Choices for 
Strangers or Best Friends
Method
Participants. Seventy-three participants (35 men; M age = 
23.83, SD =7.57) were recruited from the Cambridge central 
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library and the University College London Union area and 
tested in the same manner as in the earlier studies.
Materials and Procedure. The induction of social distance was 
identical to Study 3. Participants were asked to imagine the tar-
get person and make intertemporal decisions on behalf of that 
person, with half deciding for the stranger and the other half 
deciding for their closest contact. After making intertemporal 
choices, participants were asked the same two questions about 
closeness and similarity to the target person as in Study 3.
Results
Manipulation Check. The purpose of the experimental manip-
ulation was to have the “closest person” as a target person in 
the friend condition and the “mere acquaintance” in the 
stranger condition. Three outliers were excluded from the 
friend condition because their “familiarity” ratings were 5 or 
lower, suggesting that participants actually did not know the 
person very well whom they listed as the closest person. One 
outlier was excluded from the stranger condition because the 
“familiarity” rating was 7, indicating that the participant 
knew the target person very well whom he or she thought of 
as a mere acquaintance.
A significant difference in the “familiarity” rating was 
observed for the friend condition (M = 6.84, SD = 0.37) com-
pared with the stranger condition (M = 2.49, SD = 1.10), F(1, 
67) = 455.10, p < .001, η
p
2 = .87. “Similarity” rating also dif-
fered significantly between the friend condition (M = 5.22, 
SD = 1.43) and the stranger condition (M = 2.80, SD = 1.20), 
F(1, 67) = 58.70, p < .001, η
p
2 = .47.
Temporal Discounting. A one-way ANOVA with condition 
(distant vs. close target) revealed significantly reduced dis-
counting for the distant target (M = 404.05, SD = 59.79) 
compared with the close target (M = 366.88, SD = 77.89), 
F(1, 67) = 5.02, p = .03, η
p
2 = .07. Temporal discounting was 
reduced by 8.94% in the experimental condition compared 
with the control condition. In other words, participants 
showed a greater preference for the delayed, larger reward 
when acting on behalf of a stranger, which involved now and 
later options construed in an abstract, psychologically dis-
tant fashion, compared with when making the same choice 
for a close friend or family member.
Correlations. Similar to Study 3, participants’ discounted val-
ues were negatively correlated with their “similarity” ratings, 
r(69) = −.28, p = .02 (two-tailed), and “familiarity” ratings, 
r(69) = −.27, p = .03 (two-tailed). Thus, the closer partici-
pants felt to the target person, the less they were willing to 
wait for the greater reward.
Discussion
In Study 4, we found that inducing psychological distance by 
asking participants to make decisions on behalf of a stranger 
reduced temporal discounting: Relative to making intertem-
poral choices for a psychologically close person, namely, a 
close friend, making choices for a stranger led to more ratio-
nal decisions. It is noteworthy that our findings show a con-
sistent pattern of reduced temporal discounting due to 
construal level change throughout the studies. Participants’ 
data in Study 4 closely resembles those observed from Studies 
1a, 1b, and 2, but this time, we manipulated social distance 
rather than construal levels relating to temporal distance.
General Discussion
Researchers have been fascinated by the conflict between the 
“want” or “passionate” option and the “should” or “rational” 
option (for a review, Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008). 
A big puzzle emerging from this work has been why people 
sometimes fail to make optimal economic decisions although 
they are capable of doing so. However, the field of decision 
making has often focused on descriptions of erroneous deci-
sions rather than how such errors could be avoided (Milkman, 
Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009). The current research proposes a 
potential solution of coping with decision-making errors. We 
suggest that suboptimal decisions can be improved by chang-
ing psychological distance because it modulates construal 
level: A low construal level involving proximate psychologi-
cal distance encourages mental simulation to be contextually 
rich and vivid, whereas a high construal level involving dis-
tant psychological distance lacks such characteristics. 
Dissimilar levels of construal for representing a single situa-
tion might lead to supoptimal decisions. For example, inter-
temporal choices that compare psychologically proximate 
(i.e., now) and psychologically distant (i.e., later) options 
generate discrepancy in mentally representing two alterna-
tive scenarios. Consequently, an individual might discount 
future rewards not because they fail to “do the math” or are 
risk averse but because they fail to form a concrete represen-
tation of the positive future outcome. We considered such a 
mismatch of representation as the key to improving intertem-
poral choices, and hypothesized that when now and later 
options are compared on a similar level of construal, partici-
pants would make more adaptive decisions, regardless of 
whether both levels of construal are high or low.
Indeed, the results observed from five studies suggest 
that it is possible to manipulate intertemporal choice 
depending on how similar construal levels are when choos-
ing between two alternatives: When two intertemporal 
options (now and later) shared a similar level of construal 
(either both concrete, or both abstract), people made more 
financially lucrative decisions across time: When now and 
later options were construed concretely (Studies 1a, 1b, 
and 2) people discounted less. Similarly, when two options 
were construed abstractly due to increased psychological 
distance (Studies 3 and 4) people discounted less. In short, 
our studies support the notion that temporal discounting 
may be due to the construal level difference of near versus 
far future options.
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Interpreting Intertemporal Choice in the 
Framework of Psychological Distance
Previous research on intertemporal choice has supported the 
view that high-level construal helps people make more ratio-
nal and controlled decisions (Malkoc et al., 2010; Rogers & 
Bazerman, 2008). Such studies assume that the value regard-
ing the future or desired self (i.e., “should” self) involves 
high-level construals, and that representing a given situation 
under high-level construals leads people to make more 
future-oriented and adaptive choices. Research supporting 
this idea stresses characteristic features of optimal decision 
making that are often associated with high construal level 
such as patience and rationality, and by priming a high con-
strual level, people are more likely to choose the desirable 
option corresponding to such values.
In contrast, the current research suggests that a high con-
strual level may not always be beneficial, but comparing 
choice alternatives using a similar construal level can lead to 
adaptive choices, because people are able to realize choice 
consequences more clearly. Indeed, recent research on con-
strual level emphasizes that a low or high construal level is 
not necessarily better or worse, but that their fit is critical 
(e.g., Ledgerwood & Trope, 2010). Studies have demon-
strated that not only goals related to high-level values but 
also specific behavior guidance under low-level construals 
can boost task performance because high-level values can be 
broken down into concrete behavior, which in turn can help 
people achieve their goals. Such studies highlight the impor-
tance of fit rather than the specific level of construal. 
Likewise, Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi, Sligte, and 
Leder (2010) stressed the role of comparability of construals 
regarding social motivation. That is, depending on partici-
pants’ motivational state (i.e., pro-social or pro-self), coop-
erative or competitive behavior was observed under low as 
well as high levels of construal. Thus, people do not always 
make better choices under high-level construals. This effect 
is consistent with previous research showing that when a fit 
exists between mental perspectives, information is processed 
more fluently (Lee & Aaker, 2004). Similarly, a fit between 
experiential and conceptual affective cues leads to better 
recall performance than when there is no such fit (Centerbar, 
Schnall, Clore, & Garvin, 2008). Therefore, improved inter-
temporal choice observed in the current study might be partly 
due to fluency caused by construal fit, enabling people to 
evaluate alternatives with less bias.
Our research is in line with evidence showing that con-
creteness in describing a future event can increase its subjec-
tive certainty of occurring (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; 
Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, & Hirt, 1983). In Studies 1a, 1b, 
and 2, we described future events with more concrete and 
contextualized terms as opposed to describing an abstract 
sum of money. Our intention was that participants would 
imagine what they would be missing if they were to choose 
an immediate reward. That is, a detailed description of the 
now and the later options enabled participants to compare 
them in a more precise and clear way. Indeed, previous 
research showed that an event that is described in a detailed 
rather than an abstract way increased subjective likelihood 
judgments that the event might actually happen (Sherman et 
al., 1983). Similarly, future plans that use more concrete 
terms referring to how, when, and where the activity would 
take place are more likely to be implemented compared with 
plans described with abstract and general terms (Gollwitzer 
& Brandstätter, 1997). In other words, although temporally 
distant events are likely to be represented in abstract and 
general terms, once described in a detailed and contextual-
ized way, these mental representation change as if the event 
were to take place in the more immediate future. In this way, 
the later option might receive more weight in intertemporal 
decision making. However, because the future outcomes are 
often underweighted due to temporal discounting, over-
weighting the later option might help balance the overall 
decision weighting when deciding between two alternative 
intertemporal options.
One possible criticism of our work may be that although 
we hypothesize that construal level and psychological dis-
tance were the key variables underlying the observed effects, 
perhaps confounding variables led to the findings. Although 
the original effects in Studies 1b and 2 did not change once 
we took into account potential confounds such as imagery 
length or mood, it is conceivable that the manipulations of 
construal level might have also changed variables that we did 
not measure. However, we believe that although each study 
might have involved possible confounds, we cannot think of 
a single variable that could explain the pattern of all the dif-
ferent studies collectively. For example, although it is possi-
ble that participants who were in the concrete condition in 
the first three studies might have thought about their response 
option more deeply, or engaged with it more, this in itself 
could have led to less temporal discounting. However, such 
an argument would predict the opposite to what we found in 
Studies 3 and 4: Because close psychological distance such 
as thinking about a close friend rather than a distant acquain-
tance is associated with a relatively concrete representation, 
one could have equally predicted less temporal discounting, 
but there actually was more discounting for friends than for 
strangers. The only common mechanism across all studies is 
psychological distance and associated construal level, and 
this is indeed the novel contribution of our work.
Psychological Distance and Economic Decision 
Making
Our findings suggest a possible integration of existing 
research on intertemporal choice using the framework of 
CLT. In previous studies, the cause of temporal discounting 
was that the future had been perceived as uncertain (Baron, 
2000), detached from the present self (Bartels & Rips, 2010), 
and free from empathetic feelings (Loewenstein, Prelec, & 
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on August 26, 2013psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1014 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 39(8)
Shatto, 1998). We suggest that such types of representation 
relate to the consequences of psychological distance. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, the future is psychologically dis-
tant and induces high-level construals characterized by an 
abstract, general, and decontextualized mind-set. We argue 
that because of this high-level construal, future rewards are 
seen as less certain and detached from one’s currently expe-
riencing self, and as a result, people discount future rewards. 
Therefore, the notion of psychological distance and corre-
sponding construal level can serve to unify existing findings 
on temporal discounting.
One of the benefits of such an integrative framework is 
that psychological distance can be manipulated in various 
ways. As discussed earlier, psychological distance shares 
its mechanism across various dimensions such as temporal, 
social, spatial, and hypothetical distance. Therefore, 
although one dimension might be fixed, for example, at a 
specific time, manipulating another dimension, such as 
social distance, can lead to similar results as if temporal 
distance had been changed. Indeed, across four experi-
ments, temporal discounting was reduced by 10.40%, 
11.21%, and 6.06% for the temporal distance experiments 
and by 8.94% for the social distance experiment in the 
experimental conditions compared with the control condi-
tions, suggesting that the findings are comparable when 
social distance was induced to make two intertemporal 
points seem distant.
Our theoretical approach suggests that manipulating con-
strual level might also improve various other types of deci-
sion making. For example, phenomena observed in 
behavioral economics such as loss aversion (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) might similarly be influenced by 
changes in construal level. The fact that people are more sen-
sitive to losing than gaining might depend on how easily they 
can simulate gainful or costly situations. People might avoid 
costly events that seem psychologically close more than 
those that seem distant. Likewise, the value of an object 
might seem higher once it has been owned compared with 
when owning it is just imagined, which has been termed the 
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980). This effect might be due to 
the fact that direct physical contact helps people actively 
simulate what it means to own and use the object, which in 
turn makes the valuable object appear more valuable, rela-
tive to merely considering owning and using it. If this were 
the case, the endowment effect could be counteracted by 
inducing people to construe the object in abstract terms, sim-
ilar to the methods used in the current studies. Finally, induc-
ing psychological distance might help achieve greater profits 
when current emotional feelings get in the way of making 
economically beneficial choices. For example, in the 
Ultimatum Game (Güth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982), 
participants reject unfair offers extended by an opponent 
although this incurs a financial cost. People might be able to 
reduce such a cost when imagining that the offers were to be 
given at a later time, or by pretending to make decisions on 
behalf of another person.
Taken together, we propose that other biases in decision 
making alongside temporal discounting may stem from con-
sequences of varying psychological distance. Thus, adopting 
suitable levels of construal could be highly beneficial when 
implemented in applied contexts.
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Notes
1. In our research, we consider a “good decision” to be one that 
maximizes the overall financial profit. Thus, “adaptive” or 
“rational” choices refer to those that help decision makers 
receive the highest possible monetary reward.
2. There was a roughly equal distribution of men and women 
in each condition in this experiment as well as in subsequent 
experiments. The same analysis was also conducted with gen-
der as an additional factor. There was no significant effect for 
gender (p > .11), nor for the interaction of gender and con-
dition (p > .13). Thus, gender was dropped as a factor. For 
all subsequent experiments, analyses involving gender were 
performed as well. However, because none of the effects were 
significant, they are not reported.
3. Although there were no differences across conditions, we 
added enjoyment of thinking of Paris, interest in going there, 
and current happiness and excitement as covariates into sepa-
rate analyses. In no case was the original effect for temporal 
discounting reduced substantially (all ps < .04, all η
p
2 > .04), 
with no effect of any covariates (all ps > .30).
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